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COMPANY LAW IN LATIN AMERICAt
TATIN America is one of the few remaining fields for free
_ enterprise and initiative and is of especial interest as
a field for foreign investment. The American lawyer or
business executive can feel at home in dealing with corporate
practice in the countries to the South, in contrast to his ex-
perience with some of their other legal institutions. While
differing vastly in details, business corporation law is funda-
mentally the same the world over, the same economic
phenomena and the same general concepts producing similar
results. Some of the countries are far in advance of others in
industrial and financial development, but the retarded ones
tend to be guided in their legislation by the more progressive
nations and by the views of their leading authorities. There
is a confraternity among Latin jurists which tends to bring
about a measure of uniformity in fundamental concepts that
is not without influence on the course of legislation and
t This is the first of two installments of this article. The second, which wil
discuss Protection Afforded Stockholders and Creditors, will appear in the Winter
Issue of Volume XXVI of the Notre Dame Lawyer. Limitations of space and
the general inaccessibility of foreign material have rendered it advisable not to
attempt to cite authority for every assertion of fact and law; several are based
on the writer's practical experience and accordingly he invites -the reader to
accept him on faith. [Editor's note.]
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judicial decisions. A synopsis, as is here attempted, of the
main trends of corporation law, past, present and future, in
Latin America is accordingly feasible, and I hope not without
value.
I.
Industrial development, and with it the stock corporation
on any general scale, came late to Latin America, although
there were ample precedents in colonial times.
In 1441, the Portuguese had established the Lagos Comp-
any, which apparently was in all essentials a stock company;
it was organized for maritime, chiefly slave, trade. The King
of Portugal himself was an important shareholder while a
large part of the capital was furnished by Jewish merchants.
The King appointed two directors, the remainder were
elected by the shareholders. Later, overseas trade became
a monopoly of the Crown. When this was relaxed, towards
the end of the 16th century, several other companies were
formed; in 1577, a shipping company, Compankia das Naus,
was established and about the same time, the Compankia de
Trazida; in 1587, the Companhia Portuguesa das Indias
Orientaes was organized, but it did not operate. Spurred by
the example of the English and Dutch companies, grandiose
projects were formed. One in 1635 came to nought; another
company whose 61 articles were approved by the King of
Portugal on August 27, 1628, was designed to be the greatest
in the world, but in result, its operations were confined to the
Iberian peninsula. In 1649, the long projected Brazilian
company, Compankia do Commercio do Brazil, finally came
into being when its articles and by-laws including a twenty-
year trading privilege were approved by royal patent of
March 10, 1649. Jews convicted by the Inquisition were
required to invest in the company in lieu of having their
property confiscated. It was expropriated by the Crown in
1694, the shareholders being indemnified by 5% bonds.
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Several other companies, including several for the Brazilian
trade, were organized in the latter part of the 17th century.'
The index of legislation of the middle of the 18th century
contains frequent references to another company for Brazil-
ian trade, the Companhia do Pard e Maranhao, to a monopo-
listic wine company and to a tobacco company. An attempt
seems to have been made by decree in 1766 to make the notes
(apolices) of these "general companies" legal tender, but
the decree was relaxed in favor of foreign merchants in 1768,
and finally repealed in 1770.2
The Portuguese law of August 30, 1770, on the Mercantile
Registry, refers to stock companies when its speaks of Cor-
porations, public associations (sociedades) and employment
in general companies and large scale sociedades. Further
growth of corporate enterprise is shown by the confirmation
by royal letters patent of an insurance company under the
name of Companhia Permanente on August 11, 1791.
In what appears to be the earliest treatise on commercial
law in Portuguese, the author, Da Silva Lisboa, deals only
with partnerships, not corporations, but he does say that
the principal mercantile associations are the insurance comp-
anies, the banks of deposit and discount and the exclusive
(chartered) companies.4 The earliest reference to a stock
1 Fitzler, Ueberblick veber die Portuguesischen Uebersee Handesgesellschaften
des 15-18 Jahrhunderts, 24 Vn1ERsEyAuascmaT ruR Sozia. uNW RnmIR AHx-
SCHUT FUR SOZrAL uND WIRI.SCHAFTSGEScmCHT 282 (1931); 25 id. 209 (1932),
citing inter alia 4 Provas da Historia Genealogico (1718). See also Indice Chrono-
logico Remisivo da Legislacao Portuguesa, 75 (Dec. 10, 1624), 160 (March 10,
1649), 258 (January 4, 1690), 271 (Dec. 24, 1696) (1805); Di=rrn, LATIn
A11axcAN CIViLZATION, CoLONAL PERioD 681 et seq. (1945), citing 2 SnIIoNsN,
HISToIuA ECONOmICA Do BRAze, 181 et seq. (1937). See also CrsARINo, ORINE
DAS SOcIDADEs ANoNymAs No BRAsH,, CoN SuA EvoLucAo HIsTORiCA (1935).
2 Indice chronological, Remisivo da Legislacao Portuguesa parte 2a, 40, 41,
60, 74, 80, 92 (1805). See also: Instituicao da Companhia geral do Grao e Maran-
hao (1775); Instituicao da Companhia geral da agricultura das vinhas do Alto
Douro (1756); Review of the discussions relating to the Oporto Wine Company
(1814).
3 2 DA SILVA LISBOA, PaINCIPIOS DE DnmErO MERANTm (1798-1804) 528
(6th ed., Mendes de Almeida).
4 2 id. at 499. FaPRsmiA BoRGES, JURISPRUDENCIA DO CONTRACTO MERCANTIL DE
SOciEDADE (2d ed. 1844), the first book on that subject, devotes only five pages,
chiefly a resume of French law, to the stock company.
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company I have found in Brazil itself is the Bank of Brazil,
founded in 1808.
Spain was late in chartering companies for colonial trade
or for domestic monopolies. Spanish trade with the Indies
was carried on by individual merchants and partnerships
organized into guilds (consulados) which, among other func-
tions, exercised jurisdiction in commercial causes and became
a source of the Law Merchant. None of the Spanish codes
or texts before the independence of the Spanish American
countries, not even the ordinances adopted by the guild of
Bilbao in 1737, refer to stock companies, although they do
deal with partnerships. The ordinances of Bilbao constituted
the chief code of mercantile law for the Spanish colonies and
for the Spanish American countries until well into the 19th
century.
The consulados or guilds in Spain were active in recom-
mending the formation of companies for trade. From 1629
on, the Seville guild urged the development of such a project.
A Spanish author published a book on shares in Amsterdam
in 1688.6 The Barcelona guild was instrumental in the
formation of the Universal Mercantile Company of Catalonia
approved by the Cortes (legislative body) of 1702, but no
Barcelona company began operations until 1755. In practice,
if not in theory, the merchants associated in the Seville
consulado resembled the exclusive English and Dutch trading
companies of the same period.' One company apparently
5 The ordinances of Bilbao continued in force in Peru until 1853, in El
Salvador to 1855, in Mexico to 1869, in Guatemala to 1877, and in Honduras
until 1881.
6 PENso DE LA VEGA, CONFUSION DR CONFUSIONES (1688). Dialogos curiosos
entre un philosopho agudo, un mercader discreto y -un accionista erudito,
describiendo el negodo de las acciones, su origen, su etimologia, su realidad, sa
luego y su enredo (i.e. CoNFsUo OF CONrUSIONS). Curious dialogues between
an acute philosopher, a discreet merchant and a learned shareholder, describing
the business of shares, their origin, their etymology, their realities, their vitality
and their complications. Cited by 1 RODRIGUEZ RODRIGUEZ, TRATADO DE SoCIEDADEs
MERCAnr2ns 317 (1947).
7 SzsrTH, THE SPANISH GUILD MERCHANT. A HISTORY OF THE CONSULADO
1250-1700 56 n. 2, 110, 125 (1940).
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was formed about 1666 without royal grant, for privateer-
ing.
8
The earliest stock company of which I have found positive
mention was a trading company formed in 1714 for trade
with Honduras and Caracas. It had a capital of 400,000 pesos
divided into 100 shares. Profits or losses, the latter they
asked God to forbid, were to be divided pro rata. This
pious wish did not prevent complete failure.' The Caracas
Company (Real Compania Guipuzcoana de Caracas), on the
contrary, had better fortune and a consistently good divi-
dend record. It was organized by royal charter (cedula) of
September 24, 1728, and enjoyed special privileges; it was
deprived of them in 1781, and a few years later (1785) was
dissolved. 0 The organization of the company, as contrasted
with the statement of its special franchises and duties, was
left to private enterprise. The rules for its internal adminis-
tration were based on a commission's study of the organiza-
tion of foreign companies, especially the Company of Ostend
(Belgium). The shares were of a par value of 500 pesos
escudos each. The board of directors consisted of five mem-
bers, who were required to own at least 10 shares each,
and no two could be related within the second degree of
consanguinity. At least every five years they were required
to call a junta or general meeting of shareholders, at which
holders of eight shares or more had the right to vote. The
junta was required to hear a full report of the directors'
management; it could elect or depose any official, pass rules
and declare dividends.1
In the same year, 1728, a private non-monopolistic comp-
any was formed to engage in fishing and whaling. It failed
8 HussL, THA CARACAS Com.Axy 1728-1784 18 (1934).
9 HussEaY, Antecedents of Spanish Trading Companies, 9 HISPANIc Am. HIST.
RMv. 1, 20 (1929). He states, id. at 7, that a 1624 project included a plan for a
company ,to be formed in Mexico by the residents there.
10 2 Mosas, T3m SPANrS D ,D Ncas iN SouTH Atmxca c. 17 (1914);
AR.LLANO MORO, ORIGENEs DE LA ECONOEIA VENEZOLANA (1947).
11 Hussay, TnE CARAcAs CoiAxy 1728-1784 60 et seq. (1934).
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and was reorganized and taken over by the Caracas Comp-
any. The Royal Philippine Company was created in 1733, but
did not become effective. 2
The Havana company founded by Havana merchants
received its formal charter or cedula on December 18, 1740.
The capital was 1,000,000 pesos, divided into shares of 500
pesos each. Holders of eight shares or more could vote at the
general meeting where the president and five directors were
elected. It prospered at the outset and in 1745 declared a
cash dividend of 30% and a stock dividend of 100%. Dissen-
sion between Cuban and Spanish interests, however, led to
protracted litigation. 3
Something like a boom in stock companies ensued. There
was much agitation for the organization of monopolistic
trading companies on the model of the Dutch, British and
Portuguese companies. Some were organized, but there was
equally strenuous opposition. The leading economist of his
day, Uztariz, referring to the Dutch East India Company,
said: 1'
Such a company would rather be injurious than useful
here . . . [for] the vivacity of the nation can never be
reconciled to it, or engage with the coolness and temper such
projects stand in need of, to succeed, and be permanent, or
have all that patience, which the slowness of the returns
demands; especially since there arises no profits in the first
years, when usually the expenses run higher than the gains.
These traits of the Spanish character, in addition to the most
highly marked individualism in the world, partially explain
the late development of the corporation in Spanish America.
The warnings of the economists did not deter the mer-
chants from organizing companies and seeking special privi-
leges. The Barcelona merchants, after finally overcoming the
12 Hussny, op. cit. supra note 11, at 170 et seq., 203; Schurz, The Royal
Philippine Company, 3 HIsp.ic AM. HIsT. REv. 491 (1920).
13 HussEY, op. cit. supra note 11, at 207 et seq.
14 1 UzTAsiz, THEoRY AN PRACTIcE or COMERcE 180 et seq. (Kippax's
transl 1751).
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Andalusian monopoly, succeeded in obtaining a charter for
their Real Compania de Comercio para las Islas de Santo
Domingo, Puerto Rico y La Margarita (1755). Many essent-
ially monopolistic corporations, designed for purely domestic
ends, also existed in Spain. No less than five were founded
in the two years, 1746-8, but none had an encouraging ca-
reer.
15
The trade of Seville having declined, its guild circa 1762,
proposed the organization of a stock company in which
foreigners were to be invited to take shares, for trade with
the Indies, and were to be granted "great, real and perma-
nent" privileges. The government rejected the project, chiefly
because of the proposal to admit foreigners to the exclusive
trade with the Indies."
The consulado (guild) of Bilbao fathered projects in 1628
and 1668 to found a company on the model of the English
and Dutch companies, but they never came to fruition. In
1736, the Compania de navegacion y comercio de Buenos
Aires, Tucuman y Paraguay was projected. The text of the
plan and the detailed by-laws have come down to us. The
capital was to be 2,000,000 pesos, divided into 4,000 shares
of 500 pesos each. Full negotiability of the shares was
provided and a stock register was to. be kept. They were
contemplated as an investment for widows and orphans.
Since there was considerable opposition to the company's
demand for special privileges, they were never obtained.
Another project was put forward in 1764 for a Louisiana
company,17 and in 1783 in Alicante for a company to operate
in New Spain (Mexico)."8
15 Hussay, op. cit. supra note 11, at 217 et seq.
16 ANTUNEZ Y AcEVEDo, MEmORIAs HISTORICAs So3RE iA LGISLACION Y
GOBRnMNO DEL Co0rCIO, etc. 276 (1797).
17 1 GUiARD Y LAmAuRx, Historia del Consulado de Bilbao 245; 2 id. at 344
et seq., 366 (1918). Incidentally, this is an important source book for United
States colonial shipping history.
Is 1 RoDRIGuEz RODRIGUEZ, op. cit. supra note 6, at 6, 7.
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The most important Spanish company for colonial inves-
tors was the National Bank of San Carlos created by royal
cedula or charter of June 2, 1782.19 The authorized capital
was 15,000,000 pesos divided into 150,000 shares; one-half
was allocated for subscription in Spain and other European
countries, the other half to the colonies. Shares could be
acquired by any persons, including religious orders and their
members, with the right to assign or endorse them freely,
according to the laws governing bills of exchange, at a
higher or lower price than that paid by them.
Contrary to earlier practice in Spain, aliens whether resi-
dent or non-resident could hold shares in their own name
and vote personally or by proxy. A wise and enlightened
principle was included, which unfortunately has been aban-
doned in recent decades throughout the world: foreign
shareholders were guaranteed that in the event of war with
the countries of which they were subjects, their stock was
to be protected by the Law of Nations and they were to
enjoy it as in peacetime. Upon their death, their shares were
to pass to their heirs in conformity with the law of their
nationality.
Some of the provisions of the charter are still current in
the corporation statutes in Spanish America. The business
management of the bank was to be vested in the share-
holders, acting through eight directors elected by the ma-
jority. Directors were required to own fifty shares each,
which were inalienable during their term of office. To prevent
the inconveniences of unduly large shareholders' meetings, a
holding of twenty-five shares was required for voting and
no one could vote more than twenty-five. Voting by proxy
19 A few articles of the cedula are reproduced in NovismA RECOPILACiON,
Lib. 9, Tit. 3, Law 6. The entire charter is to be found in 3 ExTRAcvo PUNTUAL
DE LAS PRAGMATICAS, CEDuLAs, ETC. DEL SENoR D. CARLos III CAP. XII, 292 et
seq. (1793). Previously banking in Spain and the colonies had been restricted
to partnerships with unlimited liability. HEViA BoLANo, LABERINTO DE COMEM=o
18 (1619). There was a precedent for the guarantee to foreigners in a project
for a company in 1688, to be formed in the Netherlands. Hussey, Antecedents ol
Spanish Trading Companies, Y HspsAc AM. HisT. REv. 17 (1929).
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was authorized. It was the duty of the attorney general
of the nation to attend meetings, without vote, and insure
that the basic laws of the bank were followed.
Strenuous efforts were made to place stock in the colonies
and substantial subscriptions were received, chiefly from
local public funds, on the strength of an implied promise
that branches of the bank would be opened in the principal
cities of America. None in fact were opened. Moneys received
in Spain from the colonies after the subscription books had
been closed were, by a gracious act of benevolent despotism,
invested in the King's pet project, the Royal Philippine
Company, under the guise of giving the investors the full
advantages.20 There was active speculation in the bank's
shares in Paris.21
In the Spanish colonies themselves, several stock comp-
anies were projected, and a considerable number were or-
ganized. A pamphlet was issued in Lima, Peru, in 1732,
advocating foreign trading companies." From a letter ad-
dressed by the Consulado of Lima to the King on August 29,
1738,23 it appears that a company was organized to discover
and work mines. The fate of this company is not disclosed.
Towards the latter part of the 18th century several mining
companies apparently were formed.2"
20 VAsQUEz, DocrnqAs Y REALiDADEs EN LA LExisLAcIoN PARA Los INDIos
342-56 (1940); Carrera Stampa, Las Instituciones de Credit& en la Epoca Colonial,
4 EL FORo 225, 242 (1947). The investment from the Indians' funds alone was
114,329 pesos. One hundred printed copies of the minutes of the stockholders'
meeting of December, 1785, were distributed in Mexico. For the Royal Philippine
Company, see Schurz, supra note 12, at 491.
21 1 SANT.LAx, MEaroA HrsTocA SOBRE L0s BANcos NAc oNALES DE SAN
CARLos, etc. 21 (1865).
22 Reflexiones sobre ventaias del comercio Inaritimo por companias extran-
jeras de accionistas asi en general como en especial respecto de Indias (Lima 1732)
(not verified).
23 EL INDICE DEL ARCHIVO DEL TRIBUNAL DEL CONSULADo DE LIWA con UN
EsrUDio HISTORICO DE ESTA INsTIrUCIoN roR ROBERT. SYDNEY Smrnm 167 (1948).
The Lima consulado was technically abolished by a law of 1876, but because
the law was not immediately promulgated, the consulado continued until 1887.
24 I have in my possession a stock certificate of one of these companies.
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In Mexico, the first stock company has not been traced,
but in the latter third of the 18th century several were
organized.25 The Guatemalan Indigo Growers Society (Socie-
dad de Cosecheros de Anil) of 1782 was more in the nature
of a cooperative society than of a stock corporation.26 The
Bank of Havana had been organized before 1785.27 A seal
fishery company was operating in Buenos Aires in 1802.2"
The "mining partnership," later taken over into the law
of our Western states, made the basic idea of corporations
familiar, since it was divided into 24 shares, called barras,
which were transferable without effecting dissolution of the
partnership. They originated in Mexico, then called New
Spain, and were regulated by the famous Ordenanzas de
Mineria de Nueva Espana of 1783, which were in force by
express enactment or by tacit recognition throughout Spanish
America. These ordinances created a mining guild in New
Spain, which in turn organized a bank to finance the industry.
The bank was not, however, a separate entity.29 Both the
commercial guilds (consulados) 3 and the mining guilds gave
the colonials some experience in corporate organization. But
on the whole the marked individualism of the Spanish char-
acter did not furnish a spur to the spirit of association on
a large scale.
25 Carrera Stampa, supra note 20, at 252. See also DAIILGREN, MinAs
HISTORICAS DE LA REPUBLICAN MEXICAwA (1887); DEr.GADO, LAS PwIMERAS TENTA-
TIVAS FUNDACIONES BANCARIAS EN MEXICO (1945).
26 30 HispANmc Am. HIsT. REv. 336 (1950).
27 Schurz, supra note 12, at 499. Two of the directors of the Havana
bank as well as directors of Spanish banks (San Carlos, Banco de los Gremios,
Seville) were on the board of the Royal Philippine Company.
28 2 LEveNE, HIsToRiA EcoNoMvCA 162 (1926).
29 See HowE, TnE MnNG Gurw oF NEW Spain Am> ITS TRUNAL GENERA
1770-1821 (1949).
30 Consulados, following the Spanish models, were established in Mexico 1592,
Lima 1593, Caracas and Guatemala 1793, Buenos Aires and Havana 1794, Car-
tagena, Santiago de Chile, Guadalajara and Vera Cruz 1795, Montevideo 1812,
and in Valparaiso 1839. The Chilean consulados survived until 1865, the Guate-
mala consulado until 1871. See SoLoRzANo, PoLiTICA INDiANA LIa. VI, Cap. XIV,
Nos. 23-25 (1647); NovisimA REcOPirACION Lib. 9, Tit. 2; Smith, The Institution
of the Consviado in New Spain, 24 HiSPANIC Am. HisT. REv. 61 (1944); 1
OLAvARRm AvmLA, MANUAL DE DERECHO COmERCIAL 159, 160 (1950).
COMPANY LAW IN LATIN AMERICA
The interesting thing to note about these Portuguese,
Spanish and colonial companies is that, in contrast to the
rule laid down by Coke and Blackstone and which is still
followed in our law, they did not derive their corporate
personality from the sovereign, but only their special mo-
nopolistic privileges. The corporate or legal personality came
from men associating themselves, under the Law Merchant,
into a "company." All "companies," whether formed as a
general partnership or a limited partnership (compania en
comandita) had a legal personality separate and apart from
that of the individual members. This separate or corporate
personality adhered automatically to this new form of comp-
any, the stock company or anonima as it was soon to be
called. In Spain, as in Portugal,31 insurance was effected by
companies without royal grant, and other companies con-
ducted business without special charter.
This concept was continued in the Spanish Commercial
Code of 1829, which did not require governmental approval
for a corporation. It did require judicial approval; the
articles and by-laws had to be passed upon and approved
by the Commercial Court, but this was limited to verifying
whether the papers were in conformity with law. The concept
that corporate personality emanates from the free will of the
parties, not from an act of State, continues to be the under-
lying theory of the law in Latin America, even in some of the
countries where special government authorization is required
in order to do business. In others, the creation of a new
juristic person is the result of compliance with numerous
formalities of which government approval is only one.
Argentina is one of the countries where government inter-
vention has gone furthest, yet a recent writer was never-
theless able to state: 32 "The law does not create corpora-
tions; it simply recognizes, expressly or impliedly, their
31 Insurance companies were first subject to regulation in Portugal by
Regulations of August 30, 1820. FmEnRR BORGES, op. cit. supra note 4, at 36.
32 1 SATANOWSKY, ESTUDIOS DE De mco COImRmCIAl 61 (1950).
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existence as realities." This, I believe, on historical and
analytical grounds, correctly represents general Latin Ameri-
can law.
There has never been confusion, as there has been in our
law, between the business corporation and other corporations
-foundations, associations and political entities. The busi-
ness corporation was an exclusive creation of the Law Mer-
chant. Whatever its remote origins in Roman Law, business
company law has been little influenced, except in phrase-
ology, by medieval theories relating to other types of cor-
porations. The codes deal separately with juristic persons,
under the general title of persons, and with the societas under
contracts.
The Spanish Law Merchant like our common law was
based on a premise of realism. The stock company is not a
creature of sovereign power. It is not the State which gives
it life. There is no concession theory. Nor is there any need
for a legislative grant of limited liability; it flows automati-
cally, under the Law Merchant, from the association of
individuals in a stock company. Contrary to the history of
our own law, no legislative authority was required for the
limitation; the codes and statutes are merely declaratory
of the existing law. 33
During the colonial era, factories (we would today call
them branches) were established by the South Sea Company
in Panama, Cartagena and other ports. 4 The slave trade
to Venezuela was for a time in the hands of a foreign comp-
any. Neither of these forerunners had any influence on the
later development of corporation law. It was otherwise with
33 See Rooney, Maitland and the Corporate Revolution, 26 N. Y. U. L. REv.
24 (1951).
34 A VIEw OF THE COASTS, COUNTRIES AND ISLANDS WnTimN THE Lnnrs
OF THE SoUmH SEA COPANY (1711); 1 LEVENE, op. cit. supra note 28, at 287.
The Panama branch was flourishing in 1732 when its agents befriended Cocimuaw,
THE UNPORTUNATE ENGISH MAN, 155 et seq. (2d ed. 1773). The first edition (1733)
of this book was published under the title A JOURNEY OVER LAND, FROM THE
GULF OF HONDURAS TO THE GREAT SOUTH SEA.
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the British mining and other companies which flooded into
Mexico, Peru, Colombia and other countries following inde-
pendence." They were the first stock companies known in
the Spanish American countries, with the exception of the
few colonial companies above referred to. These British
companies laid the practical groundwork and many of the
forms for the later development. Throughout the 19th cent-
ury, foreign companies or domestic companies controlled by
foreign capital overshadowed purely national companies.
Foreign capital investment is still an important factor in all
of the Latin American countries and predominant in the
economy of several of them. Its influence in shaping cor-
porate usages and practices has been preponderant. These
practices, or rather the economic realities behind them, have
at times been in conflict with rigid statutory provisions and
have created a dilemma for the courts: whether to interpret
the law falsely to accord with the facts or to throttle
progress. 6
Perhaps the first stock company in Argentina was the
bank, "Caja Nacional de Fondos de Sud America," organized
in 181.8. It attracted no deposits and folded up. In 1822, the
Banco de Buenos Aires was organized as a stock company.
It is interesting to note how English practice was followed
in the legal name of the Bank - "The Directors and
Company of the Bank of Buenos Aires." 37
Similarly, the earliest native stock company in Colombia
was the Bank of Venezuela. British influence is vividly seen
35 Rippy, Latin America and the British Investment Boom of the 1820's,
19 J. MODERN HisT. 122 (1947). In Colombia, the most important of these
companies was the Colombian Mining Association, whose chief engineer was the
famous Robert Stephenson. For the Mexican companies, see WARD, MEXICO, Wim
ACCOUNT OF = MmNrO, CowyAams (2d ed. 1828). A wild venture was the
River Plata Mining Association; see HEAD, REPoRTS RELATinG To TH FAmnum OF
Tim Rio PLATA M=G AssociAarOw (1827).
30 1 RivAROLA, SoCIEDADEs ANoNimAs 3 et seq. (1935). Rivarola is the only
writer I have met who stresses the importance of foreign influence.
37 PEREZ, BANCOs Y MONEDA EN LA ARGENTINA 21, 23 (1944).
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in the law, dated April 5, 1825,35 authorizing its establish-
ment with a capital of two million pesos, divided into 20,000
shares. The subscribers, their heirs and successors were
deemed a corporation or civil association under the name of
"The President, Directors and Company of the Bank of
Venezuela." Throughout the charter, British phraseology
is predominant with unnecessary provisions (from the Span-
ish point of view) as to the corporate powers, including the
right to sue and be sued and to have "a common seal" (an
unintelligible phrase in Spanish).
A still earlier mention of stock companies is found in
Colombian legislation 39 granting a pearl fishery concession
to the company of Rundell, Bridge and Rundell. The law
included the proviso that the concessionaires be obligated
to admit as shareholders any Colombians who at any time
desired to become interested in the franchise. Other joint
stock companies, foreign and native, were organized for
public works shortly after independence. The first mining
law of Colombia made special provision for large-scale
mining companies. °
In Mexico, the earliest legislative reference is in Decree
No. 367 of October 7, 1823,"' which authorized aliens to
acquire "acciones" in mines, but it is not certain whether
this actually meant stock or merely interests in mining
partnerships. A law of May 27, 1831, mentions a roadbuild-
ing company (compania poblana), but it is not clear whether
the reference is to an existing or a contemplated company.
The textbooks continued silent.42
38 2 CODIFICACION NACIONAL No. 221, p. 56 (1924). Columbia at that
time included Venezuela and Ecuador.
39 Decree-Law of Aug. 11, 1823, [1823] 1 CODIFICAC oN NACiONAL No. 143,
p. 280 (1924). The reference to "companies" in Law of July 31, 1823, is
ambiguous; it may mean partnerships. Id. No. 123, p. 244.
40 Law of Oct. 24, 1829, Art. 9 [1829] 4 CODTXlCACION NACIONAL No. 589,
pp. 92, 94 (1926).
41 1 DUBLAN y LOzANo, LF- isLAcIoN M-XICANA (1876); ScHmwr, CiviL LAW
OF SPAIN AND M-xico 337 (1851) translates "acciones" to mean "stock."
42 The 1851 edition of the NuEvo FEBREMO MXICANo quotes only the 1829
Spanish Code; in the appendix of forms it gives none for stock companies,
although a number of partnership forms are given.
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In Chile, the earliest reference in legislation was a decree
of May 2, 1827, by which the government assigned the
irrigation canal of Maipo to a company with an authorized
capital of 750,000 pesos, managed by a board of five directors
who were required to hold at least four shares each. At
shareholders' meetings, each share entitled the holder to
one vote, cast in person or by proxy, but no individual was
allowed to have more than twenty shares. 3 As the share-
holders were the holders of irrigation rights, it was in effect
a cooperative society.
More important historically was the Santiago-Valparaiso
Railway Company. A law of August 28, 1851, authorized
the construction of the railway and provided that the Presi-
dent of Chile invite the inhabitants of the country to form
a stock company for that purpose, the government partici-
pating in the amount of 2,000,000 pesos. Subscriptions were
obtained from a private group for a like amount and the
government subscribed its quota. The first general meeting
of shareholders was called to be held at the Consulado in
Valparaiso on April 5, 1852. The articles of association and
by-laws were approved by the Executive on July 8, 1852.
Article nine provided that the shareholders were liable only
up to the amount of their shares. To qualify for member-
ship on the Board of Directors, five in number, the directors
were required to own 50 shares, inalienable during their
term of office.
The approval of the articles by the government was
ostensibly required only because it was the major share-
holder, but this procedure set the pattern for subsequent
legislation in Chile. The law of Stock Companies of Novem-
ber 8, 1854, provided that stock companies exist only by
virtue of a decree of the government authorizing them.
Stock companies then existing and not approved by special
action of the legislature, were required to seek the necessary
43 ZENTENO, EL Bo]LTn DE LAS LEs 148 et seq. (1861).
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executive authorization within six months, under penalty of
being considered general partnerships.44
In Peru, the earliest reference to corporations in the legis-
lative record is to the decree of December 24, 182 5,45 admitt-
ing a British mining company into the republic. Also, a bank
was projected in 1831 as a stock company.46 The earliest
reference I have found to domestic corporations is a presi-
dential decree of November 15, 1845, authorizing the con-
struction of a railway from Lima to Callao by means of a
stock company. A proposal on behalf of a London company
was rejected.4
The earliest legislative reference in Uruguay is the Law
of July 2, 1857, authorizing Maua y Ca. to establish a bank
of issue, deposit and discount: "
... with authority in addition to its limited liability and own
capital, to admit associates and capitalists with liability limited
solely to the amounts they subscribe, issuing certificates of
stock representing such capitals in the manner, form and
conditions which they deem advisable in this market [i.e.
Montevideo] or outside.
But there is no doubt that stock companies, not seeking
special privileges, could be formed without legislative or
executive authority. A law of July 17, 1839, expressly
provided that commercial causes should be decided by the
Uruguayan laws, the Ordinances of Bilbao, mercantile usage
and practices, the Spanish compiled laws, and the Partidas,49
in the order named in case of silence on the matter in-
44 20 Boletin de las Leyes 37, 94, 102 (1852). The Copiapo railway company
had been previously organized and in the same year, 1852, a telegraph company
was organized. Id. at 258, 265; 22 id. at 400 et seq. (1854).
45 2 Coleccion de Leyes, Decretos y Ordenes 1881-1830 No. 233, p. 194 (1832).
46 Proyecto de un Banco Nacional aprobado por el Supremo Gobierno y
presentado al Congreso Constitucional de 1831 by Jose Paulino Acevedo (1832).
47 OvIEoO, CoL E 0N DE LEYES, DECRar Os Y ORDFNES 1821-1859 Nos. 2300,
2301, pp. 133, 134 (1861).
48 2 Coleccion Legislativa del Uruguay 114 (1876).
49 A Spanish code of laws divided into seven parts which was compiled
about the year 1250. It was a codification of the customary law of all the Spanish
provinces, the canon law as administered in Spain and the Roman law. BI.Acx,
LAw DIcTroNARY 1024 (4th ed. 1951).
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volved.50 Since none of the statutory sources named above
treat of stock companies, they were to be dealt with accord-
ing to mercantile usage.
As to the origin of the stock company in statutory law,
as distinguished from its origin arising out of usage, it came
to Latin America in its present form through the French
Code of Commerce of 1807, and the Spanish Commercial
Code of 1829. The Spanish Code was far superior to the
French as a work of codification since the latter, for the
most part, was simply a reproduction of earlier French
ordinances. The French Code did, however, recognize and
regulate for the first time the societe anonyme, using the
term in a sense different to that of Pothier and others of the
18th century.51 It was called "anonymous" to distinguish
it from partnerships in which the name of one or more of the
partners constituted the firm name or style. In the anonyme,
the use of the names of individuals was prohibited and the
company was to be known by its principal object. This is
still the law under a few of the codes, but is disregarded
in practice and the modern statutes permit the use of
personal names, under appropriate safeguards.52 The French
anonyme passed into the Spanish and Portuguese languages
50 1 Colleccion Legislativa del Uruguay 434, 435 (1876). The Consulado of
Montevideo was created by decree (auto) of the Captain General, May 23, 1812,
to be governed by the royal cedula. of June 30, 1794, which created the Consulado
of Buenos Aires. 1 Id. at 571 et seq. It was finally abolished May 22, 1898, 2
id. at 166.
51 The earlier societe anonyme was merely a joint venture. The anonymous
partnership authorized by the Irish Parliament in 1782 was more like our
present -limited partnership. FoRmoy, FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN CoNTaXY LAW 44
(1923).
52 E.g. Colombia, Law 26 of 1922; Spain, Royal Order June 12, 1925,
despite a seemingly contrary provision in the Commercial Code; Brazil, art.
3, Decree-Law 2627 of 1940. Curiously enough, the latest code, that of Honduras,
provides that any person who allows his name to appear in the denomination
of the company shall be liable in solido and without limit for the corporate
operations. Article 91 CODIGO DE CoMEmRGo, DEcRaro 73 (1950); La Gaceta, May
6, 1950. This may be due to the influence of 1 RODaGuas RODRiGuEZ, op. cit. supra
note 6, at 284, who considers the practice dangerous and believes that dt should
be made illegal. In Peru, despite the language of the Code seemingly to the
contrary (art. 160), personal names are used since there is no express prohibition.
LEON MONTALBAN, DERE Ho CommcrAL 294 (1943).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
as sociedad anonima or compania anonima and sociedade
anonima, respectively.
The early commercial codes in Latin America were copies
or adaptations of the French and the Spanish Codes referred
to above.53 The first relatively new codifications were those
of Brazil, 1850, and Chile, 1865. Parts of the Brazilian
Code are still in force, but the chapter on corporations has
been repealed in its entirety. The Chilean Code, however,
still forms the main basis for the corporation law of that
country. The Argentine Code of Commerce of 1889 and the
Uruguayan Code of 1889 play the same fundamental role.
The proper and logical place for the law on stock companies
is in the commercial code, but the actual or assumed exigen-
cies of regulating this form of business organization have
led to the enactment of special laws or decrees without
awaiting the slower process of a total revision of the code.
Only Guatemala (1942) and Honduras (1950) have in
recent years adopted new commercial codes. It is with these
special enactments that we are here principally concerned
in noting the modern trend.
II.
The French Code grouped together under the general
head of socigtg the three forms of (1) general or collective
partnerships, (2) the limited partnership or socigtj -en com-
mandite, and (3) the anonyme or stock company. 4
The Spanish Code of Commerce of 1829, like the French
Code, dealt with the stock company as merely a variant
of partnerships.
53 See Eder, Law and Justice in Latin America, 1 LAW: A CENTURY oF
PROGRESS 39 (1937).
54 New York adopted the limited partnership in 1822, and other states
followed. One special form of it, the limited partnership with shares assigned
to the special partners, we did not adopt. It was, however, recognized by all
the Latin-American codes, but was not availed of in practice; only in the
Argentine did it ever attain any importance, and it has now practically died
out there.
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This may partially explain why the organization of comp-
anies under the 1829 Code led to a wave of speculation. One
writer said: 11
Under the favor of these rules directed to gather capital
proportionate to the great improvements needed by the coun-
try, we have recently seen a cloud of stock companies whose
shares gained fabulous premiums from the moment of offer.
These premiums, growing every minute, caused such obfusca-
tion that even persons proof against the fever of mining,
fearful of the fate of the public funds and lacking confidence
in the stability of the Bank, contributed their capital to stock
companies. It was a spectacle to see how shares and offers of
shares flew from hand to hand; how they were purchased
for cash and time purchases were haggled over; how gaily
money was risked and debts assumed without measure. It
could be said that the shadow of John Law needled the tardy
so that all believers rushed without discretion to their ruin.
Only thus could such a great whirlwind.of papers of all sizes
and colors be formed that specie disappeared and all confidence
was lost. The crash of so many fortunes and the general clamor
that was raised against the speculation that had destroyed
them necessitated other enactments that could give assurance
to the utility and morality of mercantile stock companies.
The fruit of this urgency was the law of January 28, 1848 and
the Regulations of February 17, 1848.
Article 1 of the 1848 law provided that no company, the
capital of which was divided in whole or in part into shares,
could be constituted except by virtue of a statute or of a
royal decree. It was not long, however, before Spain reverted
to the principle of freedom of association.
A corporation in our law is a legal entity deriving its
existence from the State, whereas a partnership is a creature
of contract without an entity apart from its members. A
partnership, in contrast to the corporation, rests solely on
the partners' common law right to contract with each
other.56 On both points, the Law Merchant of the Latin
countries is in contrast to our law. Corporations and part-
55 EscRIcnE, DICCIONAuO DE LEGsLAcIoN Y JURISPRUDEwCIA 1469 (9th ed.
1907).
56 18 Cj.S. 389.
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nerships alike are embraced under the general concept of
societas. Neither derives its existence from the State; both
flow from the right of association and freedom of contract;
both are legal entities separate and apart from the members.
Our law also recognizes the contractual conception of a
corporation. A corporate charter, it is said, is a "contract"
of a threefold nature, in that it forms a basis for a contract
between the State and corporation, the corporation and its
stockholders, and between stockholders themselves."
The sharp theoretical distinction in our law between
partnerships and corporations was not made in these codes
or in their followers. Both forms of business organization
were species of a single genus, the societas; both were
juristic persons, legal entities separate and apart from the
associates; the prospective associates were at liberty to
choose whichever form they desired. The shareholders in a
corporation were considered partners, but their liability was
limited to the amount of their contributions, as in special
or limited partnerships.
The theory of contract dominated legal and political
thought of that epoch. Marriage was a contract; even the
organization of political society was deemed to be based
on contract, Rousseau's concept of the social compact. So
naturally the societY, the business corporation, was but
another species of contract. This conception of the corpora-
tion still survives in the language of the codes and statutes
with one or two exceptions, but it is today either completely
rejected in doctrinal writings or tortured into a special
category far from the orthodox contract. What has been
called in continental literature the "crisis of contract" has
nowhere been in stronger evidence than in connection with
the stock company. There was never any echo of the doc-
trine of the Dartmouth College case,58 that a corporate
57 In re National Mills, Inc., 133 F. (2d) 604, 609 (7th Cir. 1943).
58 Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 4 L. Ed. 629
(U.S. 1819).
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charter constituted a contract with the State. It was con-
sidered merely as a contract between the associates; the
rights of a corporation did not flow from an act of divine
grace of the Sovereign, but from the principle of freedom
of association, long recognized by the Law Merchant and
eventually finding its recognition in constitutional law.
The insufficiency of the ordinary concept of contract to
explain the complicated phenomena of the modern corpora-
tion is generally recognized in doctrinal writings, although
most of the codes embody this idea. A view that has been
gaining ground, under the inspiration of Hauriou's work
and that of his disciples, is that the corporation is an "insti-
tution." The institutional theory of law is not very clearly
defined. We are familiar with the view that marriage, for
instance, is an institution, not a contract; but otherwise this
theory has not made headway in our law.
Hauriou's theory of the institution was in part based on
the stock company. It has been developed by his disciples
into many fields and is now put forward as a substitute
for the contract theory of the corporation. 0 The general
theory it is said: "
•.. would seem to reduce itself to the statement of the import-
ance in the structure and evolution of society of the permanent
organizations which serve the collective interest. In their
totality they constitute the individuality of the state.
59 Hauriou, An Interpretation of the Principles of Public Law, 31 HAR. L.
REv. 813 (1918).
0 The chief exponent is GnxzxRD, LA Soc=rnr ANONYmm DE DnmsrN (1935),
and it has an ardent advocate in De Sola Canizares, La teoria de la institudon
como base para la reglamentacion de las sociedades por acciones, 1 REv-IsTA
Tpmr=STRAL DE Dmaxcno CoxaicAL, No. 5, June 1947, Bogota 5, and in report
to the Third Congress of Comparative Law, (unpublished 1950). It is also
approved by Serkovic, La Sociedad Anonima, 11 RZvSsA DE DERxco Y -IEcrAs
PoLirIcAs 77 (1947); 12 id. at 75; and by RETAiL, AD rAzsrr io r GESTION
DES SocIETrs COM CALs 13 (2d ed. 1947). Micou, Corporate Financing under
Latin American Law, 22 CoRNrEL L. Q. 490, 508 (1937), gives a summary. The
theory is strongly criticized by 1 SATANowsxy, op. cit. supra note 32, at 91
et seq., who also maintains that we are confronted not with a "crisis of contract,"
but with a crisis of individual liberty. 1 id. at 128 et seq.
61 4 ENCYc. Soc. Scr. 280 (1932).
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As applied to corporations, it is explained as having three
main elements: a central directive idea - profit; the vesting
of authority as an organized power; the communion of all
members of the group around the directive idea and its
realization.
There is one paradox resulting from the application of
the institutional theory as a basis for the business corpora-
tion. Hauriou's whole philosophy was to lay stress on
liberty, on individualism, on the primary importance of
private enterprise as the sole path of progress for any
society, on the validity of custom and on the subordination
of public law to private law. The theory of the institution
as applied to corporations works to the contrary in practice.
It tends to justify the increasing intervention of the State
in corporate affairs; it tends to absorb the corporation into
public law, to make corporation law a part of administrative
law, a retrogression to the days of the early quasi-political
chartered companies which were instruments of an all
powerful mercantilist State. It is not surprising, therefore, to
find writers who, while dissatisfied with the classic theory
of contract, do not accept the institutional theory.
The theory of the institution has been officially endorsed
in Cuba. The preamble to Decree-Law No. 842 of April 20,
1936, establishing a Central Registry for stock companies
in order to avoid conflicting names, states: 2
Even though stock companies like other associations [socie-
dades] have their origin in and are based on a contract, it is
universally recognized that they are vested with the character
of institutions and that, joined with the private interests of
each shareholder, there is a collective interest and hence
it is appropriate to adopt special provisions in regard to them.
The preamble further stated that in conformity with the
demands of the present era as expounded by writers, a
constant and effective intervention by the State was re-
quired; but the decree went no further than to provide
62 2 NUNEZ, CODIGO DE CoNmRcIo 45 et seq. (1939).
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for the Central Registry and Cuba remains a country where
corporations are free from government control.6 3 The Regis-
trar is authorized to refuse registration to a company whose
articles fail to meet the legal requirements; but he must
present grounds for his decision and an administrative
appeal is allowed from his rulings.
Another theory that has had some following is that the
corporation is a "complex act"; that it is an aggregate of
parallel declarations of will having an identical content and
for an identical purpose. While a contract produces effects
only between the contracting parties, the complex act in-
fluences the legal sphere of third parties. In a contract, there
are conflicting interests; in the complex act, the interests are
parallel. This theory is criticized on the matter .of fact
ground, that in corporations also, there are conflicting
interests. The essential nature of a societas is not the coinci-
dence of interests, but the community of purpose, the
common object. 4
The chief difficulty of the contract theory is that while
the incorporators are presumably familiar with the contract
they are signing, it is going against the facts to consider
that subsequent holders of shares are acquainted with the
articles of association; very often they deal in shares as
vehicles of speculation and nothing more. To say they are
presumed to know the articles may serve to overcome the
difficulty as a matter of legal technique, but it departs from
the basic notion of contract. Moreover, it is of the essence
of contract that it cannot be modified except by mutual
accord of the parties. In the corporation, on the other hand,
63 A Decree of September 12, 1940 for government supervision has not
been applied.
64 1 RODRIGUEZ RODRIGUEz, op. cit. supra note 6, at 21. Rodriguez accepts
Ascarelli's views that the corporation is a plurilateral contract. He points out,
1 id. at 24, that bilaterality is not of the essence of a contract and that Article
1792 of the Mexican Civil Code furnishes a basis for recognition of plurilateral
or open contracts. Ascareli's views are expounded in numerous works, especially
PROBLEMAS DAS SocnsADES ANolmas (1945). 1 FERREmA BORGEs, INsTITUcoEs
DE Dnrmo Co=URacm 240 (1946), also espouses them.
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the articles can be modified by vote of a specified majority
of the shareholders.
The writers who do not reject entirely the concept of a
contract hold that it is a contract of a special nature, which
they have named a "plurilateral" contract; it is not the
only plurilateral contract, but the most important of the
species. The corporation arises from a contract of this special
type and becomes a new entity, a juristic person. In this
unique contract, while each party is the possessor of rights
and obligations, the obligations do not run to each party
but to all. Expressed in a mathematical symbol, the ordinary
contract would be represented by a straight line, each party
being at one extremity of the line; the plurilateral contract
would be represented by a circle.
Where the corporation is formed by subscriptions and
the parties are not present, the obligations of the subscribers
would run towards all the others. 5 Fraud or other vice of
consent does not vitiate the plurilateral contract, unless
it comes from all other parties and impossibility as to one
party does not affect the others. Deliberation and action is
by a majority; this is prohibited in other contracts where
unanimous consent is required. Perhaps the main character-
istic of the plurilateral contract is that it is "open" - new
parties may enter and become vested with the same rights
as the original parties possess.
The Brazilian statute of 1940 avoids the use of the word
"contract." The author of the law states that it is impossible
to explain and resolve the problems of the stock company
within contractual rules. It is not constituted by a contract,
but by a concurrence of parallel wills, by a plurality of
unilateral acts.6
65 Two methods of organization are provided by the codes and statutes;
simultaneous organization and "successive" organization which is, organization by
subsequent subscriptions. The second form is more complicated and extremely
rare in practice.
66 De Sola Canizares, Les Societes Commerdales en Arnerique Latine, 2
Cahiers de Legislation et de Bibliographie Juridiques de 'amerique Latine, No. 5,
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The concept of contract or of partnership, entails as a
necessary consequence, that the minimum possible number
of shareholders is two; 67 thus, the concept of the so-called
"one-man)) or uni-personal company is repugnant to it. In
fact, not only for incorporation, but for the continued exist-
ence of the corporation, many of the Latin American codes
or statutes require a larger number of incorporators and
shareholders. In practice this is evaded by the use of dum-
mies, but this device is fraught with a potential danger for
the legality of all the shares passing into a single hand is
not recognized there as it is in this country. We have become
so callous to the use of dummies to conceal the uni-personal
nature at time of incorporation, that we fail to see the
inherent absurdities of going through this procedural fiction.
Iowa, as far as I know, is the only state that has permitted
incorporation by a single individual.68 Proposals have been
made in Latin America to give the single trader limited
liability without incorporation and without resort to dummy
partners or dummy shareholders. However, none of these
proposals have been enacted into law.
Under the present state of the law in Latin America, if
the number of shareholders falls below the minimum num-
ber, the corporation theoretically becomes a nullity and is
subject to dissolution. The authorities are predominantly
in accord with this view. There is one decision of an
Argentine court to the contrary, but it has been criticized."
There are dicta of lower courts in Cuba supported by an
151, 197 (1950), quoting Miranda. The Guatemala Code of Commerce also avoids
the word contract in its definition of the stock company, art. 384 (1942).
67 Two incorporators are permissible in Chile, Cuba, Nicaragua, Peru and
Uruguay.
68 IowA CODn § 491.2 (1946).
69 1 RODRIGUEZ RODRIGUEZ, op. cit. supra note 6, at 281, 499. TELLADo, LAs
SociDADEs Co= uCAr.s Ex LA REPUBUzCA DOMrMNICANA 416 (1939). In Haiti
recently, a corporation was dissolved because it had only one shareholder. De
Sola Canizares, supra note 66, at 90.
70 Camara Comercial, June 22, 1927, 25 JURISmPRUDENCIr.A ARGFNTIxA 296;
Fr=ANDEZ, CoDiro DE CoumRcio ANOTADO (1946).
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eminent authority "' and a decision of the Supreme Tribunal
of Spain also to the contrary. The Spanish court held that
courts cannot extend the grounds for dissolution expressed
in the code and that since transfer of all shares into the
hands of a single owner is not expressly stated as a ground
for dissolution, it does not affect the existence of the
company.72 This decision would undoubtedly be given
weight in Cuba and Peru, where the Spanish code is in force.
Where bearer shares are used, it is exceedingly difficult to
enforce the theoretical rule. The recent Colombian compila-
tion 73 attempts to meet this difficulty. The decree provides
that dissolution resulting from acquisition by one sole person
shall be evidenced when only one person attends the share-
holders' meeting as sole shareholder, when he collects all
the dividends or when by any other trustworthy means the
directors verify this ground for dissolution. It is hard to
envisage law less realistic. The decree throws doubt on the
previous law as generally understood whereby dissolution
took place if the number of shareholders fell below the
statutory requirement of five. The new decree provides as a
cause for dissolution, the acquisition of all the shares by a
sole person, natural or juristic. In any event, no effective
procedure seems to be provided, since the Superintendent
of Shares Companies was given no express power, as he is
in other cases (e.g., loss of 50% of the capital) to declare
a dissolution. Nevertheless, he would undoubtedly terminate
the company's authority to do business.
71 DioIGo, LA SOCIEDAD A RESPONSABILiDAD Lm ADA 19 (1936).
72 Tribunal Supremo, April 11, 1945; DE RAYo Y RODRIGUEZ, LA COM'PANIA
ANONI.A 113 (1949).
73 Decree 2521 of July 27, 1950; 7 REvISTA D LA S-UPERINTENDENCIA DE
SociEDADs ANONIMAS, No. 20, art. 190 (August 1950); the Decree has also
been published by the REVIsTA TRIrMSTRAL DR DEREcHo COwmERcIL (1950) under
the title Sociedades Anonimas (Regimen Legal en Colombia).
74 7 REVISTA DE LA SUPERINTENDENCIA DE SOCieDADEs AwoNioAs, No. 20, art.
187 (August 1950).
COMPANY LAW IN LATIN AMERICA
III.
It was the Spanish Law of January 28, 1848 "' that the
Latin American codifiers had before them as a model. Hence
the Brazilian Code of 1850, the Law of 1854 incorporated
in the Chilean Code of 1865, the Argentine Code of 1859-
1862, and the Uruguayan Code of 1865 required the execu-
tive power to approve the articles of association. This did
not mean that the charter emanated from the State, but
merely that the executive was to pass on the conformity
of the articles to the law, theoretically a merely ministerial
act. In nearly all the other countries, the liberal movement
in Europe was influential and the requirement for govern-
ment approval was either never enacted or speedily abol-
ished.
Despite the strong influence of French, Spanish and
Italian law, the principle of freedom of association was
not universally followed in Ibero-America. Executive au-
thority is required in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Guatemala,
Haiti, Honduras, Uruguay, and since 1938, in Colombia. In
none of these is the mercantile theory openly denied, but
the corporation bureaus tend to stretch their authority to
the limit of, or beyond, the law. Under the guise of deter-
mining whether or not a proposed corporation meets the
requirements of the statutes, they exercise an arbitrary
discretion which goes unchallenged, since no lawyer or
business man cares to antagonize the authorities or delay
his start by appeal to the courts. Rare is it to find men with
sufficient enthusiasm to maintain that struggle for law
essential to its preservation. Assertion of rights when tramp-
led on is the price of law.
In some Ibero-American countries, executive authoriza-
tion is not required for ordinary business corporations but
only for special types of business. The exceptions have
become more and more numerous. Banking, insurance,
75 See text at note 55, supra.
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hydro-electric and other utility corporations, public works,
oil and mining are the most frequent instances, and authori-
zation for these rests in the discretion of the president or
ministers. These exceptions, of vital importance as they are,
are beyond the scope of this article.
The modern tendency has been in the direction of a retro-
gression to state intervention with the substitution of bu-
reaucratic authority for general laws. As with all bureau-
cracies, they have tended to usurp powers not given them
by statute. Not infrequently these usurpations have later
been confirmed by statute or by executive decrees having
the force of law. We cannot go into detailed study of all
the countries, but must select a few of the leading ones
for the purpose of this article.
Argentina: The Spanish code of 1829 was adopted in a
few provinces (states): Mendoza, Corrientes and San Juan.
When the first national Code of Commerce was adopted in
1862, the legislation in force throughout the country with
the exception of these three provinces was the old Spanish
law which contained no provision concerning stock compa-
nies. The hazardous political life of Argentina, before union
was finally attained, gave little time for thought about laws
regulating stock companies. The 1889 Commercial Code of
Argentina, still in force, came largely from abroad and was
based on the Italian and Portuguese codes. However, the
Spanish idiosyncrasy could not be uprooted by paper sta-
tutes. In 1889, the progress of the country had scarcely
begun and nearly all limited companies were of English
origin with English capital and enterprise. Even purely Ar-
gentine companies frequently adopted English names for
the sake of prestige. Consequently, corporate practice not-
withstanding the statute, became firmly molded on British
lines. Even when not controlled by foreign interests, the
natural tendency was to imitate the established foreign
procedures and forms. The result has been an amalgam of
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all these varying sources. The courts have had difficulty
in reconciling economic practice and facts with rigid pro-
visions in the statute. Although custom is not a source of
commercial law in Argentina as in other countries, and
cannot abrogate a statute, nevertheless the courts have tend-
ed at times to disregard the statute and enforce custom.
They have been placed, as already noted, in an unfortunate
dilemma: either to give a false interpretation to the statute,
which generates a disrespect for law, or to throttle progress.
The Code came during the Baring crash, an unfortunate
time in the economic history of the country. From 1882 to
1890, 404 corporations had been organized, but in the crash
more than 200, with an authorized capital of 300 million
pesos, failed. In nearly all of these, the administrative
officials in their search for power, exaggeratedly claimed
that there had been abuses and even criminal offenses. A
decree of March 21, 1890 provided for executive interven-
tion and executive decrees have progressively strengthened
state control.7 6
The steps for the organization of a company are as
follows: 1. Execution of the articles of association (which
also include what we put into our by-laws) before a notary
public; 2. Application to the General Inspection of Justice,
with presentation of the articles and the minutes of the
original meeting. Approval is granted upon finding that the
documents are in conformity with the requirements of the
code and statutes and that the object of the company is not
against public policy. Once approval is advised by the
Inspeccion, the application goes to the Ministry of Justice,
which ordinarily relies upon the action of the Inspeccion. The
file is referred to various government departments, e.g., the
anti-trust authorities, the Enemy Property Board and the
tax authorities. The presidential decree, countersigned by
the Minister of Justice, granting incorporation, is then
76 RwVAROLA, op. dt. supra note 36, at 3 et seq., 92 et seq.; Faa&ANDEZ,
op. cit. supra note 70, at 840 et seq.
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issued; 3. Theoretical existence as a legal entity commences
with the presidential decree, but the company cannot yet
begin business. A certified copy of all the proceedings,
including the presidential decree, must be entered on the
books of a notary public. All the papers are then presented
to the Commercial Court which issues an order directing
publication and recording in the Mercantile Register. When
publication and recording are completed, the company ob-
tains its permanent account books and can then commence
business.77
By Decree of November 17, 1908, replaced by Decree of
April 27, 1923, wide powers were given to the Corporation
Bureau, the Inspeccion de Justicia. The writers are nearly
unanimous in the view that many of these powers are
without statutory authority, 8 but promoters naturally anx-
ious to avoid delay have accepted administrative rulings.
The Argentine Code orders imperatively that the articles
must be approved if they are in conformity with the law
and not contrary to public policy, but the Code is silent
as to the remedy for the abuse of this power. The courts
have refused to interfere with the executive's discretion.79
Companies which refuse or hinder inspection and supervision
by the Inspeccion are subject to forfeiture of their corporate
franchise by administrative act. The decree authorizes in-
spectors to attend and even to preside at meetings; the
Inspeccion can force a call for meetings and it has the
widest powers of audit. Every company must obtain au-
77 BENSON, ORGANIZING A BusiNEss UNDER ARGENTINE LAW (1947); MARvEL
& O'FARRELL, MEMORANDUM ON CoIvmPANY LAW (3d ed. 1951).
78 FERNANDEZ, op. cit. supra note 70, at 496 et seq. Rojo CARDENAS,
CONTRALOR POR EL EsTADO DE LAS SocIADEs ANONiMAS 49 (1947).
79 1 R.vAROLA, op. cit. supra note 36, at 23; Rojo CARDENAS, op. Cit. supra
note 78, at 51 et seq., citing Standard Oil, S.A. v. La Nacion, Camara Federal
de la Capital, March 10, 1944, 1 JURISPRUDENCIA ARGENTINA 618 (1944). The
plaintiff attacked as unconstitutional the resolution of the executive, which
denied authority to increase the capital of the company. The appellate court,
reversing the lower court, held that the executive was the sole judge of "public
interest." There was a dissenting opinion with which Rojo Cardenas agrees,
holding that unappealable executive discretion infringes the sphere of judicial
power.
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thority from the Inspeccion to fix the date of its meetings
and must present its balance sheet and report to the Inspec-
cion. Pursuant to a decree of October 31, 1923, copies of
minutes of meetings must be presented to the Inspeccion
within fifteen days."0 A balance sheet must be prepared
every quarter and must be submitted to the Inspeccion.
Although the text of the decree is rigorous, supervision by
the Inspeccion is not too burdensome or hindersome in
practice.81
Chile: The Chilean Constitution enumerates among the
special powers of the President the authority 82 "to grant
juridical personality to private corporations and to cancel
the same; to approve the by-laws by which they are gov-
erned, to reject the same, and to accept modifications."
The first Chilean law was that of November 8, 1854,
which was substantially incorporated into the Commercial
Code of 1865. The President's only duty, in granting au-
thorization to a stock company, was to see that the legal
requirements were duly followed. Legally, the President
cannot refuse authorization if the articles of association
contain no violation of the statutes.8 3
The tightening of government control and the expansion
of government intervention has been the continuous char-
acteristic of Chilean jurisprudence since the 1854 law. The
Inspeccion General de Sociedades Anonimas was created in
1928 to carry out the presidential function.84 The name of
this bureau was changed to Superintendencia de Sociedades
80 FEamANDEZ, op. cit. supra note 70, at 840 et seq.
81 De Sola Canizares, supra note 66, at 184; BENsoN, op. cit. supra note 77,
at 31. As a result of -the federal system, the provinces (states) also have estab-
lished "inspections," the federal inspection applying only to the Capitol and
national territories. Rojo CARDExAs, op. cit. supra note 78, at 113 et seq.
82 Quoted from Ta CoNsnrruTioNs oF rx AvmRacAs, articles 72, 155
(Fitzgibbon ed. 1948). Estatutos, therein translated "by-laws," includes the
articles of association as well as what we know as by-laws.
83 HERA REYES, SocrwEADEs ANONmsAs 15, 71 (1935).
84 Law of 4404 of September 10, 1828.
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Anonimas by the basic law still in force.85 The chief purpose
is to prevent frauds on the part of promoters and managers,
and the underlying principle is that prevention is better than
punishment.
The procedure for incorporation is, from our point of
view, exceedingly complicated and cumbersome. The first
step is the preparation of a prospectus, the contents of
which are prescribed in considerable detail.8" Next is the
execution of the articles of association before a notary
public. A petition to the Ministry follows, which refers the
matter to the Superintendency for a report on the legal and
economic aspects of the company. Based on this report,
the President may either: (1) deny authorization, stating
his reasons (there is no appeal from an adverse decision);
(2) require modification of the articles or by-laws; or (3)
issue a decree of existence. The succeeding steps are the
formalities of publicity - registration in the Mercantile
Registry and publication in the Official Gazette. When these
have been accomplished, the administrative proceedings
start afresh with a like petition to the Ministry, report by
the Superintendency, which requires proof of payment of
the amount subscribed by a certificate of a bank, and finally,
the President issues a decree of installations which fixes
the time when the company is to begin operations.
The same formalities are required for any amendment
to the charter. If the amendment is to increase the capital,
authorization is not granted except upon proof to the Super-
intendency that the increase is absolutely and immediately
necessary and that it will be of benefit to the business and
to the country.87
In spite of these cumbersome formalities and restrictions,
business has adjusted itself to them. There are active stock
exchanges of high standing in Santiago and Valparaiso,
85 Decree-Law 251 of May 20, 1931.
86 Id., art. 86.
87 2 OLAVARRTA AvnA, op. cit. supra note 30, at 136-49.
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both originally organized as private enterprises without
government intervention.
Colombia: In Colombia, the procedure for incorporation
is almost as cumbersome as' in Chile. A Superintendency of
Share Companies was authorized wide powers by Law 58 of
1931, but was not actually established until Decree 1984 of
1939. The Ordinances of Bilbao had remained in force in
Colombia until 1853, when the country (at the time called
New Granada) substantially adopted the Spanish Commer-
cial Code of 1829. It remained in force only a few years,
a federal system being established and most of the sovereign
states enacted their own codes for governing interior com-
merce. The provisions of the Code of Commerce of the
State of Cundinamarca on corporations were almost a
literal copy of those of the Santa Cruz code of Bolivia of
1834, the corporate articles of which were taken from the
Spanish Code of 1829. This Cundinamarca Code was adopt-
ed by three other states. No government authorization was
required; simply submission to the court for approval as
to legality, in practice never refused, of the notarial instru-
ment. After centralization, the requirement for government
authorization (although permissible under the Constitution
of 1886) was abolished, not to be reinstated until 1939.
Incorporation was simple and many of Colombia's leading
corporations date from this period.
Colombia's constitution vests the President with authority
to exercise supervision over banks of issue and other estab-
lishments of credit and over mercantile corporations in
accordance with law.8  The corporation law presently in
effect 89 is the compilation of prior statutes and rulings, with
some additional material. It differs from the Chilean law
in that for the ordinary company, no prospectus or signa-
ture of the president is required, except for foreign corpora-
88 GmsoN, Tn Co1xsTiTuTioNs or CoLouB A 427, 428 (1948).
89 Decree No. 2521 of July 27, 1950; 7 REVISTA DE LA SUPINTENDENCIA DE
SocxEDAD~s ANONI:AS, No. 20 (August 1950).
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tions. Otherwise the procedure is substantially the same:
notarial instrument, registry, publication and finally, two
applications to, and two resolutions by, the Superintendency.
The corporation must give notice in advance to the Super-
intendency of all shareholders' meetings and copies of the
minutes must be sent to it.9" The Superintendency has the
right of inspection at any time; "' the right to impose fines,92
and inter alia the power to delist from the stock exchange,
subject to approval by the Ministry, any company for
violation of the legal prescriptions; the right to suspend or
revoke the authority to do business for a like violation or for
ultra vires acts.93 Any person may denounce irregularities or
violations.94 In certain situations there is an appeal to the
Council of State.95
The requirement for prior government authorization has
met with constant opposition in all countries on diverse
grounds: that it is an unconstitutional restriction on the
right of freedom of association; that the supposed protection
to the public is illusory; that the task is beyond the capacity
of States with poorly organized civil services; that it is a
hindrance to progress; that it infringes on the constitutional
separation of powers; that it is an obstacle to commerce
without corresponding benefits; that tutelage by the law is
better than tutelage by the government; that judicial func-
tions should not be entrusted to the administration; 96 and
90 Id., art. 103, 104.
91 Id., art 275. A company can, upon somewhat burdensome proof and
procedure, obtain exemption from this inspection.
92 Id., art. 274.
93 Id., art. 288.
94 Id., art. 289.
95 Id., art. 290.
96 E.g., I SEGoviA, Conrmo DE COMERCiO 361 (1892); CRUCHAGA, DE LA
REGLAmENTACION DE LA SOCIEDAD ANONIMA EN CnME (1882); SANTEmcEs, Los
BANCOS CHILENOS (1893); VARELA, LA INTERVENCION DE Los GOBIERNOS EN LA
SocIEDAD ANONIMA 101 (1908); VARGAS SALINAS, LAS NOCIEDADEs ANONI.AS 46
(1923) ; 1 RIVAROLA, op. cit. supra note 36, at 23 et seq. See also Rojo CARDENAS,
op. cit. supra note 78, at 38; EsQuIvEL OBRxOoN, LATIN Aia-ANc CommRCiAr.
LAW 189 (1921). This work contains a useful summary of the corporation laws
then existing, which can be compared to De Sola Canizares' recent comprehensive
studies. Note 66 supra.
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that it is violative of principles dear to the adherents of
19th century economic liberalism, including the present
unregenerate writer. A recent Chilean writer " not only
defends it, but goes further and urges the Superintendency
to assure that corporations conduct themselves so as to
fulfill their social function in a country like Chile, one of
the most socialized in the world.
One element which has not been sufficiently stressed is
that bureaucratic control tends to stereotype corporate or-
ganization, thus choking the evolution of new types of
securities and techniques of management. If stereotyped
by-laws are presented to the corporation bureau, the course
of trite law will run smooth. Though the requirements of
business are infinite and variations from the norm are indis-
pensable, trouble ensues if innovation be attempted.
Even the best drafted statutes are not always crystal
clear. There is always scope for interpretation, especially
as to what is mandatory or merely supplementary or op-
tional, what is a matter of public policy which cannot be set
aside by the parties, and as to what rights can be waived.
Commentators and courts differ widely in their interpreta-
tions.
The Law Merchant, a joint product of business men and
their legal advisers who were unhampered by restrictive
legislation, was always alert to evolve new forms and
techniques; witness, the negotiable instrument, the stock
company itself, and in recent times, the commercial letter
of credit and the trust receipt. Codes should be drafted with
sufficient flexibility to permit this evolution. It is to be
feared, despite the general intent of its draftsmen, that our
pending draft Commercial Code 08 does not sufficiently pro-
vide for this flexibility and freedom.
97 2 OLAVARRrA AviLA, op. cit. supra note 30, at 135.
98 UNIFORM Com~ imC CODE, Proposed Final Draft No. 2 (Spring 1951).
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Brazil, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Mexi-
co, Panama, Peru and El Salvador require no government
authorization for incorporation. The historical record does
not disclose that abuses have been more frequent in these
countries than in the countries where authorization is re-
quired. The Panama law closely follows our more liberal
statutes and was modeled after the law of Florida. It has
become, as it was designed to be, a favorite site for incor-
poration. The 1946 constitution 11 permits companies, assoc-
iations and foundations that are not contrary to morality
or the legal order to be formed and to obtain recognition
as juridical persons.
Brazil: In Brazil, the first general corporation law 10
adopted the French name of "anonymous company." It
provided for government authorization, based according to
the report of the Minister of Justice on the need to verify
that the object of the company was lawful, that the capital
was sufficient for the proposed purposes and that the articles
gave the shareholders due control. No substantial change
was made in the Commercial Code of 1850. Its scanty pro-
visions on stock companies were amplified by later laws.'0°
The purpose of examination of the articles of association by
the Government was to see that the object of the company
did not conflict with morality or create a monopoly; where
there is an issue of stock for property, that the true value
was duly appraised. Under British and French influence
freedom of origination was permitted, the prior govern-
mental authorization being replaced by detailed statutory
regulation and full publicity. Numerous laws and decrees
were later enacted, making codification necessary. This was
effected in 1940.02 The Code was drafted in accord with
the modern spirit and it contains some happy innovations.
99 THE coNsTITuTIoNs or =E AaE.RIcAs, op. cit. supra note 82, at 610.
100 Decree of January 10, 1849.
101 Law 1083 of August 22, 1860 and Decree 2711 of December 19, 1860.
102 Decree-Law No. 2627 of September 26, 1940.
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Under it, there has been a great increase in corporate activ-
ity, an indication that the law is working well; but it must
be borne in mind that Brazil has been enjoying an era of
prosperity, as have most of the Latin American countries,
and the present law has yet to stand the test of a depression.
No government authorization is required for organization,
but the Commercial Registrar is entrusted with quasi-
judicial functions and has the delicate task of passing on the
conformity of the articles (and of any amendments) with
the statute. The Junta de Commercio (the mercantile regis-
try) of Sao Paulo has rejected a great many charters. Ac-
cordingly, it is current practice, accepted as valid, to author-
ize the directors, in the certificate or instrument of
incorporation, to accept modifications suggested by the
Registrar. Opinions differ whether there can be any appeal
from his decisions. The decision of the Registrar, however,
accepting and filing a charter is not res judicata; the nullity
of the corporation may still be declared by the courts pro-
vided the declaration has no retroactive effect."'
Mexico: In corporate organization matters, Mexico pre-
fers judicial supervision to administrative control. The
articles of association are submitted to the Commercial
Judge to pass upon their conformity with the law, after the
Attorney General's office is heard. There is no executive
intervention except for certain classes of companies: bank-
ing, insurance, etc. Public issues, however, may be strictly
supervised by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(Comision Nacional de Valores). Influence from the United
103 2 DA SILVA LISBOA, op. dt. supra note 3, at 604; De Sola Canizares,
supra note 66, at 195 et seq., based chiefly on the treatise of the author of the
law, 2 MMANDA VALVERDE, SoCMDADES POR AcoES (1941); AsCARELr, op. cit.
supra note 64, at 487 et seq. The doctrine as to the nullity of corporations
is an unfortunate importation from France, generally adopted in Latin America.
It has sometimes been rigorously applied. In one case in my practice, the
Colombian Superintendent of Share Companies ruled that a company that had
been operating for 28 years was a nullity because of a slight delay in registering
in the Commercial Registry, and ordered its dissolution. However, the tendency
of the courts is to mitigate the rigors of this doctrine.
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States seems to have been strong here. By law of December
30, 1939, the requirements for the sale of shares to the
public were specified, including authorization by the execu-
tive exercised through a commission. The present statute,
repealing and replacing that of 1939, is the Decree of
February 11, 1946, and the regulations of January 15, 1947.
The Commission, inter alia, authorizes or denies listing on
the stock exchange; passes upon maximum and minimum
rates of interest on bonds; has full rights of supervision and
inspection; and has authority over public offerings of securi-
ties not listed on the stock exchange. The Commission is
authorized to convene stockholders' meetings and to pass
upon the value of property given as consideration for stock
listed on the Exchange. Dealers must receive authorization
from the Commission. 10 4
Perhaps the system of government control or the possi-
bility of government inspection as a deterrent to malpractice
has inspired the confidence of investors, but this writer is
inclined to believe that other factors have been more
influential.
(To be concluded)
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